Sraffa and Keynes can doubtless be put together for their having made a true 'revolution' in economic theory in the last century. Though they followed different research paths one from each other, they both went very deeply into the foundations of the established economic theory, up to the point of subverting, within their own models, the traditional way of thinking and representing the functioning of an economic system.
As is well known, the subtitle of Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (PC) is Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory.
Starting from that prelude, a huge amount of work has been done, mainly addressed to bringing about all the possible logical faults of the analytical framework of the traditional theory.
That work, which has been done along the lines suggested by Sraffa, has proved to be a necessarily first step for the reconstruction of an alternative economic theory having the old Classical economists' approach as its frame of reference. It can be affirmed that the 'first phase' -to use Walsh's terminology, Walsh (2000) , p. 5 -of the revival of the old Classical Political Economy has been already completed, and its ultimate aim has surely been achieved, viz. that of showing how feeble were the logical premises on which the traditional theory was basing its propositions and prescriptions. 1 As a matter of fact, however, the neoclassical paradigm is not just still alive but also dominating as ever, no wonder the contrast between the factual economic events of the world and its theoretical properties. 2 Thus, in this connection a suspicion spontaneously arises, viz. that the ideological content embedded and conveyed by the neoclassical paradigm be far stronger than the analytical framework which supports that paradigm itself. We want to argue, in particular, that the ideological content of neoclassical theory might concisely be expressed by the strong confidence in the market mechanism and by the belief that the market be the most suitable institution in regulating all the relevant relations among the people.
The aim of Part I of this paper is that of exploring the possibility of considering Sraffa's prelude to a critique of economic theory also from a different, though complementary, perspective, with respect to that taken up during the first phase of the revival of Classical theory. That alternative perspective, which we do believe much needed now to better accomplish that revival, views Sraffa's theory as ultimately addressed to criticise the neoclassical paradigm for its obsessively considering the market as the pivotal institution for the working of an economic system.
In the sequel of Part I of the paper, in fact, we would like to emphasise some aspects of the Sraffa theory which over the first phase of that revival have been either forgotten or not sufficiently stressed.
These aspects, as will be argued in the next sections, are strictly connected with issues generally and improperly deemed us outside the realm of 'economic' considerations -issues mainly concerning ethical and moral aspects of the life of a community. By contrast, we firmly believe them should be viewed as indissolubly intertwined with the 'economic' ones, in the same fashion as the old Classical economists, Smith (1970) , Ricardo (1970) and also Marx (1973 Marx ( ), (1974 , viewed them.
The present contribution should thus be considered as naturally belonging to what Walsh (2000) , once again, calls the 'second phase' of the Classical theory revival, which seems particularly characterised by a reappraisal of the works of Adam Smith. 3 2. Two fundamental features make their appearance at the very beginning of Sraffa's PC, wherein the initial tables of numbers represent quantities of commodities used and produced in the production processes:
the inclusion of the sustenance for the workers among the commodities used for production;
(ii) the self-reproduction of the system as a whole as the ultimate as the ultimate objective of the economy.
These two features, which are running throughout the whole book of Sraffa, highly characterise the Sraffian alternative paradigm, as opposed to the neoclassical one. Before examining the reasons which lie at the basis of such a statement, it is worth making some remarks as a preliminary.
The sustenance for the workers is expressed, commodity by commodity, in physical terms. Its quantitative dimension and its qualitative composition, however, are determined neither simply nor univocally -and it does not make any difference, in this respect, whether workers' subsistence be determined by referring to strictly physiological conditions or, more generally, to social conditions. On reflection, in fact, the commodity set which constitutes that sustenance for the workers must be considered as the end result of a complex historical process, whose characterising factors are represented by the social, political and physical environment in which the people of the system considered live, by their institutional arrangement, by their education, by their culture, by their power relations, by their religion, by their customs. 4 Each one of these factors, being directly related to human life, in general, and to the livelihood of the people, in particular, can find its own expression only by means of value judgements.
The latter statement should sound quite obvious. Thus, for example, the problem of determining the most 'appropriate' diet for a human being, of a given community at a given moment of time, does not possess an a priori univocal solution. Is the diet, in fact, appropriate for a 'long' or for a 'short' life? What are the 'strictly necessary' consumption goods? What is the most 'appropriate' proportion between 'biologically indispensable' goods and 'spiritually indispensable' goods?
It is worth noticing that the unavoidable recourse to value judgements is still required for the determination of the means of production. This might seem less evident than in the case of subsistence, because the means of production appear only indirectly related to the livelihood of the people (or, in any case, they might seem related to the livelihood of the people in a different fashion than subsistence). Yet, on further reflection, the means of production also are the end result of the same complex historical process which determines subsistence, and therefore they share with subsistence the same set of determinant factors.
3. The considerations made in the precedent section on the nature of both subsistence and means of production, in their ultimately being the quantitative expression of value judgements, lead straightforward to the impossibility of looking at the quantities of the commodities appearing in Sraffa's representation of the economy just as mere 'observable' data.
The way in which the economy is there represented, in fact, is not value neutral; on the contrary, it is the outcome of a process involving deep value judgments. Put it other way, it can be said that 'facts' are not separated from 'values', since both of them result unavoidably 'entangled' -to borrow Putnam's terminology, Putnam (2003) .
Without entering the philosophical endless discussions on the presumed dichotomy between 'facts' and 'values' -at the end of which that dichotomy seems to have been definitely thrown out, for it was found logically faulty -it suffices here to point out that the distinction between 'facts' and 'values' is paradoxically still existing and persisting in most parts of the economic literature which make use of the neoclassical paradigm, together with the strong resistance of taking into accounts 'values' within the boundaries of the discipline -notwithstanding Sen's reiterated efforts in showing its logical and factual faultiness in economics, a discipline which should essentially be devoted to tackle problems of people's well-being.
5
Within the neoclassical paradigm, one of the effects produced by the belief that 'facts' could be so easily separated from 'values' has been that of facilitating an analogous process of a neat separation of the 'economy' as such from the more general system. An immediate consequence of this process has been the further belief that the 'economy', as an autonomous entity, could be governed by laws of its own, uncontaminated by any value judgement.
6
A second effect, not less important than the first one already pointed out above, has been that of believing 'economics' as having the same sort of statute of the so called 'hard' sciences, in which a presumed separation between 'facts' and 'values' was generally thought to be possible -with the consequence of making far grater the distance between Science and Ethics, as any value judgement was automatically put outside the boundaries of the theory because it was supposed to belong to the non-scientific sphere.
This process of rendering economics a value-free discipline, as is well known, has been tenaciously pursued by Robbins in the early 30s, and it has pervasively permeated since then the entire neoclassical paradigm.
-5 -represent it is not value-free. The inner complexity of his own representation can be appreciated having in mind points (i) and (ii) above.
As regards the inclusion of workers' subsistence in the representation of the economy, it should be noted that the whole set of commodities, used and produced, by which the economy is being represented cannot be conceptually fractioned into distinct and independent parts. The quantitative relations among those commodities as a whole establish whether the system is 'viable' or not, viz. whether the system is capable of being brought to a self-replacing state, i.e. whether it is potentially self-sufficient.
The notion of 'viability' in Sraffa is crucially important, as will be seen presently, for it allows, in the first instance, the unambiguous selection of those systems worth of analytical consideration. 8 The key factors behind the 'viability' of a system are what Sraffa concisely calls 'methods of production and productive consumption', which correspond exactly to the set composed by workers' subsistence, the means of productions and the quantities of commodities produced. As a consequence, the 'viability' of a system, being determined by the same set of factors determining workers' subsistence and the means of production, is but a reflection of value judgements as well.
Among the 'viable' systems, Sraffa makes a distinction between those producing for subsistence from those producing with a 'surplus'. A 'surplus', which a given community could have at its disposal at any given moment of time, cannot be viewed as a 'gift' of nature, nor, even worse, as the result of some 'magic'. More seriously, a 'surplus', as much as 'viability', should be viewed as a historically determined set of commodities, in the precise sense already explained above -its existence and its amount crucially depending upon workers' subsistence, in the first place, and secondly upon the means of production.
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In the latter statement, a greater weight in the determination of the existence and the amount of a 'surplus' has been attributed to workers' subsistence. The reason of this lies in the fact, already pointed out above, that the characterising factors of the historical process responsible in shaping workers' subsistence and the means of production act distinctively in different ways and in different degrees. Consumption goods, as contrasted with the means of production, influence the quality of people's livelihood more directly and more sensitively.
5. The viability of the system as the ultimate objective to be pursued by the economy is the other important feature of Sraffa's PC. Viability essentially means the possibility for human beings to survive. The remarkable thing, in this connection, is that Sraffa makes it so explicit at the very beginning of his work. It thus appear as the natural end to be pursued by any community.
For the system to achieve its viability, i.e. its own self-sufficiency, it is required that the commodities produced be exchanged in certain proportions. The primary role attributed to the exchange ratios, which formally spring out as the solution to the system of equations corresponding to the specific economy considered, is precisely that of making viability effective. One of the reasons for them to be called 'necessary' or 'natural' -terms used by the classical economists and Marx and adopted by Sraffa as well -seems then to be that they are strictly connected with the objective of viability, which is the natural end of any community of human beings. In this connection, it should be noted two fundamental features of the 'core' of Sraffa's system. First, its structure cannot be given unless the determinants of its constituent parts are known, and thus unless a basic set of value judgements, of the kind indicated in section 2 above, have been already expressed.
One of the crucial consequences of the feature here under consideration is that the economist's task is far from being performed only within the boundaries of the 'core'; it has to be performed also outside them. From a different perspective, in fact, Sraffa's 'core' cannot be considered simply as a set of logically consistent relations among variables, the formal analysis of which could obviously be done by any mathematician. The economist, as a social analyst, has also to perform a semantic task of interpreting and shaping the very structure of the 'core'. For example, take initially any viable system, characterized by some given methods of production. For the latter to be shaped as to produce with no 'surplus', it is required that workers' subsistence be determinant of the structure of the system jointly and simultaneously with the methods of production. That same system, however, can alternatively be shaped as to produce with a 'surplus'. In such a case, however, workers' subsistence can be downgraded up to the point of being both quantitatively and qualitatively worse than in the former case, in such a way as to be accommodated to the methods of production, and therefore of being determined instead of its being determinant of the viability. These alternative perspectives, therefore, cannot be but a reflection of alternative value judgements.
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Another example showing the impossibility of separating the 'core' from the system as a whole can be given in relation to the choice of the numéraire. By taking as a reference a system with a 'surplus' shared by the workers, we are left with a system of equations with one degree of freedom. In such a case, any unknown variable can formally be fixed from outside the system of production to solve the system of equations, but it would be meaningless from the economic viewpoint. For the solution to be sensible, it is further required a reasoned choice of the variable, based on considerations lying outside the 'core'.
The second feature of the 'core' is that it does not contemplates the market in any form or function whatsoever. It turn out to be, within that framework, an absolutely unnecessary institution. This should be strongly contrasted with the neoclassical paradigm for several reasons.
Sraffa was in fact conceiving and writing PC over a period in which Logical Positivism was smoothly flowing from philosophy to economics, until it assumed its most popular form in Robbins' 1932 essay. In addition, over that same period, a refined mathematical work on the Walrasian General Equilibrium Theory was in progress, culminating in several important works, 11 whereas Hicks' (1939) own elaboration, appearing in his Value and Capital book at the end of the 30s, was rendering accessible to a far wider range of scholars the most robust form of the neoclassical paradigm, Hicks (1939) . When finally PC was published, the basic structure of the Walrasian General Equilibrium Theory had already assumed its definite form through the works of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959) .
Thus, Sraffa's alternative paradigm made actually its appearance at the time when the neoclassical paradigm was reaching its highest point, as far as its pervasiveness and its dominating influence are concerned. It should also be recalled that around that time a strong and harsh attack on Keynes' General Theory was already successfully launched.
The idea that a market economy had to be considered as the most 'efficient' system seemed until the 1960s absolutely triumphant. It should also be added, in this respect, that from the notion of 'efficiency' one could also derive an implicit notion of 'equity', in so far as the allocation of the given resources was supposed to follow 'objective' criteria and the distribution of income was supposed to take place according to the contribution of the respective 'factors' of production. 12 6. Sraffa's alternative paradigm was thus a very great challenge to the then orthodoxy, for it meant a proposal of a new conception of the economy, up to the point of drastically changing the objective which any economy should pursue, with no room left to the market. That objective refers straightforwardly to human life, for the self-reproduction of the system means the pursuit of the self-sufficiency of human beings. It is a holistic or macro objective by definition, since it could not be possibly otherwise -it refers, in fact, solely to the system as a whole. It can be said that the seed of Sraffa's 'revolution' lies essentially in this very new conception of the economy, which is reflected precisely by the way in which the 'core' of his theory is made up.
The analytical framework of PC, based (certainly not by chance) on the old Classical economists' approach, exactly reflects Sraffa's new 'vision', abysmally so different from the neoclassical one. The latter viewing the economy as an aggregation of 'monads', each having boundless wants, each pursuing the objective of 'maximising' some individual index, given the admitted constraints, does need an institution capable of making each and every single individual plan simultaneously compatible with any other. The exchange relations come then into the being uniquely for the achievement of that objective, and the market is supposed to perform its task, that of determining the exchange ratios, in the best way as possible by following the fundamental criterion of the relative scarcity of each commodity. This criterion thus appears completely devoid of any characteristic which, even indirectly, be connected with the life of human beings. It responds uniquely to the individualistic objective that each and every 'monad' is pursuing. In this way the neoclassical 'economy' becomes an entity completely separated from any other part of the system, living a life of its own, having its own laws and its own self-regulating mechanisms, with no reason to refer to any value judgements
In contrast, Sraffa's 'core' depicts an economic system which is only a part of a wider social system. There is nothing within the 'core' that can be determined unless 'something else' of importance has been already determined from outside the system (and, in some circumstances, even before the production processes get started).
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Workers' subsistence is the most representative specimen in this respect. It is one of the most important prerequisites for production and thus for the self-sufficiency of the system as a whole. The factors determining it, as has seen previously, have nothing to do with any characteristic pertaining to the 'core', i.e. with the production processes. This means that workers' subsistence is completely unrelated to any sort of result, whatever expressed, of the production processes.
Even in systems producing with a 'surplus', the 'surplus' wage, which the workers might possibly get in addition to subsistence, although conceivable only in value terms, is nevertheless ultimately determined by some sort of 'conflict' between the classes sharing with the 'surplus'.
It is very much worth noticing, in this connection, the important feature of 'openness' of Sraffa's analytical framework. This feature does allow to take systematically into account alternative value judgements and to incorporate them significantly into the analysis. For example, a claim could be made on the 'morality' of a certain state of income distribution or on certain ethical aspects of it. This has a direct linkage with Adam Smith, who in the final 12 Graaff (1957) makes a very lucid and sharp critique as regards the possibility for the market to provide the required information for making a rational choice. 13 A different interpretation of the 'core' is given by Pasinetti (2007) , ch. IX. chapters of The Wealth of Nations refers explicitly to ethical and moral elements, connected to the freedom and dignity of any one labourer as a person:
"By necessary I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life.
[…]But in the present time, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt" (1952), pp. 351-2.
14 Also, a new list of 'priorities' for commodities entering workers' subsistence can be defined -in contrast with the unreal postulate of commodity 'substitution', typical of the neoclassical theory. In this way, 'conflicts' arising out of the community can be viewed also as a natural means for making claims, and for explicitly making value judgements on the rules and the procedures for achieving definite goals.
7. The two features of Sraffa's PC pointed out at the very beginning of this paper, namely (i) the inclusion of the sustenance for the workers among the commodities used for production and (ii) the self-reproduction of the system as the ultimate objective of the economy, are both susceptible of being generalised within the Sraffa's analytical framework.
The starting point for such a generalisation might be that of examining more deeply the notion of self-reproduction of the system. On further reflection, in fact, self-reproduction implies continuation; and for the system to continue over time it is absolutely necessary, in the first instance, to provide for the replacement of the labour force. To do this, it is obviously required to bring up children to day, for putting them in the condition to enter the labour force tomorrow. In this connection, it is worth recalling that Ricardo defines the wage as " [t] he natural price of labour […] that price which is necessary to enable the labourers […] to subsist and to perpetuate their race […] [it] depends on the price of the food, necessaries, and conveniences require for the support of the labourer and his family", (1970), p. 93, italics added.
Moreover, since anybody might become elder or disabled, some ethical reason might be given to strongly suggest 'to feed' these people also -regardless of the fact that they respectively do not, or cannot, belong to the labour force. Therefore, beside the workers directly employed in the production processes, workers' families also should have a right for their sustenance. This right, however, although expressible on individual ground does refer by its own nature to the social requirement of the self-reproduction of the system. Had it to be disappointed, the viability of the system would be perilously jeopardised.
A further step for a generalisation of the two features indicated at the beginning of this section might even be made by introducing into Sraffa's framework the possibility of granting a Universal Basic Income (UBI).
The UBI, according to a definition given by one of his most credited supporter Van Parijs (2001), p. 5, is a monetary income paid by a government at a uniform level and at regular intervals, to each adult member of society. 15 It is given independently of the economic and social condition of the people involved, as well as independently of their willingness to work. It is thus a universal and unconditional income, with no link whatsoever to work and production.
Its roots can be dated to 1500, with Thomas More's Utopia, in which the idea of any person being provided with her/his own sustenance is explicitly stated. However, it is the well known Speenhamland Law, introduced in England in 1795 during the period of the Industrial Revolution, that can be considered, from the point of view taken in the present paper, as the crucial event. That law, in fact, settled down the principle of assuring a minimum income to the poor irrespective of their earnings, in an environment in which a dramatic transformation was taking place for labourers: their labour force was becoming a commodity in the market. The immediate and obvious implication of this was the coming into being of the neat separation between the wage, on the one hand, and the necessaries of life, on the other -a separation which had no reason to exist before the Industrial Revolution.
Sraffa's analytical framework and his whole conception of the economic system can accommodate and give strong support to such generalisations -which, by contrast, can find no place whatsoever within the neoclassical paradigm. The notions of 'subsistence' and of the 'right to live' are in fact completely ignored by, and incompatible with, that paradigm. And, worse than this, the crucial step which distances still further away the neoclassical theory from the classical and Sraffian approach is that which leads to consider labour force not only as a commodity priced on the market on the basis of its relative scarcity, but also as a commodity having its own exchange value strictly linked to its corresponding contribution to production, which -as Sraffa has definitely shown -is logically and conceptually indefinable anyway.
Part II
8. "The composition of this book has been for the author a long struggle of escape, and so must the reading of it be for most readers….-a struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression.
[…] The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds."(GT, p.viii)
The attempt we would like to perform, paraphrasing Keynes' own words reported above, is to escape not only from the modes of thought prior to the General Theory, but also from the immense literature the GT since its publication. Our intent in doing so is to focus on the very peculiarities of GT as they would have appeared to our eyes if we had read it in 1936. We are aware that this sort of experiment -if intended literally -is quite improbable to be successful, because as hard as we try we can't turn out blank our mind. Our present beliefs are shaped out from all our previous readings and experiences and our mind, in reading the GT today, cannot avoid to be influenced by our precedent formed ideas and vision. We would like simply to concentrate our attention on the GT only, disregarding the huge amount of criticisms and interpretations put forward by generations of economists over the 74 years of life of the GT. So we start our task by enucleating what appears to us be the core of the GT.
Before starting our reading, we want to call attention to the point of view taken by Keynes at the start of his investigation. It is a very odd one, if we recall that it is the time in which lord Robbins' 1932 Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science was becoming a milestone in the economic literature. In his celebrated essay Lord Robbins not only confines the subject matter of economics within the narrow boundaries of individual choices under given constraints in a world of scarcity, but also makes the classical concept of Social Product, and of any social aggregate, devoid of their full meaning. Indeed, given the nature of the price system stemming from a set of ordered preferences of single agents, " the addition of prices or individual incomes to form social aggregates is an operation with a very limited meaning", Robbins (1932) , p. 57.
Indeed Lord Robbins' book paved the way to a methodological turn through which the "scientific approach" of physics was to be transferred into economics. The method consisted essentially of deducing implications from certain postulates such as utility maximization or the equalization of supply and demand, so stressing the fundamental role of the market. From this point onwards, the attempt to introduce the powerful ideas of the method og physics gained increasing momentum; but physic's laws cannot have a correspondent counterparts in economics, because of the very nature of economic interactions involving human beings and the types of uncertainty involved into it.
By the contrary, despite Keynes' declared intention to contrast the classical theory (a note to the adjective 'classical' on p. 3 informs us that it includes "the followers of Ricardo, J.S. Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Prof. Pigou), his first step is instead to adopt Social Aggregates and particularly the Social Product as the main object of his investigation, like the old classical economists. Indeed we can consider Keynes' macroeconomic approach as the economics of the Social Product, in opposition to the economics of individual choices.
The second step is exactly to contrast the view that economic phenomena can be explored through models imported from the hard sciences, like physics, due to the pervasiveness in economic phenomena of uncertainty, in the sense stressed by Knight (1921) work, a kind of uncertainty not reducible to be measured or accounted for by any kind of probabilistic model. The aim of our brief excursus through the GT is to emphasize greatly that the 'revolutionary' aspect of Keynes' theory consists, in our view, in his strong belief about the determination of the level of aggregate output, crucially depending on effective demand, whose relevant magnitudes are thought to be fixed outside the market and independently of any market mechanism. This view results as opposite to the growing importance, at the time, of market equilibrium analysis. The decisions to be taken in a system characterized by the pervasive influence and power of money institutions, in fact, cannot ever be thought of as conducive to an 'equilibrium' of the type contemplated by the traditional theory.
9. We can find support of the above statements by going trough some relevant and meaningful passages of the General Theory.
In chapter 3 of book I, devoted to the celebrated Principle of Effective Demand, Keynes writes:
"The amount of labour N which the entrepreneurs decide to employ depends on the sum (D) of two quantities, namely D 1 , the amount which the community is expected to spend on consumption, and D 2 , the amount which the it is expected to devote to new investment. D is what we have called above the effective demand." (GT, p. 30, underlined added).
Having stated that increases in employment will rise consumption expenditure D 1 , but not to the level required to match the "aggregate supply price of the corresponding output (Z)", (giving a falling propensity to consume) he concludes by saying that "the greater the volume of employment the greater will be the gap between aggregate supply and consumption. So the amount of investments D 2 must increase to fulfil the increasing gap Z-D 1 " (GT, p. 30).
"Thus -except on the special assumptions of the classical theory according to which there is some force in operation which, when employment increases, always causes D 2 to increase sufficiently to fill the widening gap between Z and D 1 -the economic system my find itself in stable equilibrium whit N at level below full employment […] The propensity to consume and the rate of new investment determine between them the level of employment […] If the propensity to consume and the rate of new investment result in a deficient effective demand, the actual level of employment will fall short of the supply of labour potentially available at the existing real wage […] The insufficiency of effective demand will inhibit the process of production in spite of the fact that the marginal product of labour still exceeds in value the marginal disutility of employment." (GT, p. 30-31).
10. In the concise sentences above the gist of the Keynesian new approach is strongly laid down. In the following books III and IV (chapters 8 -13 of the GT) the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest are further explored.
The well known result of this discussion is that the aggregate consumption expenditure C can be considered a quite stable function of aggregate income Y, with 0<∆C/∆Y<1. On the contrary, the level of investment is very fluctuating and difficult to predict, as it depends upon expectation that cannot be easily introduced into the scheme. In the GT (chap. 11) the scale of investment is deemed as depending on the relation between the rate of interest and the schedule of marginal efficiency of capital, which in turn depends on the relation between the supply price of a capital asset and its expected return. Two chapters (12 and 13) are devoted respectively to long terms expectations and to the theory of interest. In chap. 13 the liquidity preference appears as a key element of the general theory of interest.
The rate of interests is defined as "the reward for parting with liquidity"; and "the rate of interests is not the "price" which brings into equilibrium the demand for resources to invest with the readiness to abstain from present consumption. It is the "price" which equilibrates the desire to hold wealth in the form of cash with the available quantity of cash" (p. 167).
Thus, Keynes says, the rate of interest, in given circumstances, is determined by liquiditypreference and the quantity of money. In this way money is brought in as a main factor influencing real variables. The next step made by Keynes is to explain why, given that the rate of interest is positive, should anyone find convenient to hold his balance in cash instead of holding it in a form that yields an interest. This is the part in which Keynes introduces another 'revolutionary' concept, stating the necessary condition for the existence of liquidity-preference: "There is, however, a necessary condition failing which the existence of a liquiditypreference for money as a means of holding wealth could not exist.
This necessary condition is the existence of uncertainty as to the future of the rate of interest. i.e. as to the complex of rates of interest for varying maturities which will rule at future dates". (p.168, italics in the text).
Later on, in ch. 15, Keynes explores the incentives to liquidity-preference or demand for money, both from the psychological and the business perspectives. In his analysis there is no market mechanism able to generate an equilibrium rate of interest (as the pre Keynesian theory would postulate) to make full employment correspondent to the level of effective demand. As Shackle (1973) puts it : "Liquidity preference destroys the hydraulic theories of money and interest, and shows how and why valuations can change without the occurrence of transactions" (p. 517).
So there are three independent parameters behind the determination of effective demand: i) the propensity to consume; ii) the marginal efficiency of investment; iii) the liquidity preference an bank policy, jointly influencing the expected rate of interest. These three parameters are referred to psychological or behavioural aspects of human life.
11. Without entering the countless controversies and discussion related to all these very important issues, we want to stress the common feature underling all of them: viz. that no one of them can be put into relation with the operation of the markets.
Thus, the conclusion is that income and employment determination do not depend on any form of market mechanism.
But what must be stressed is also the feature of Keynes' construction: all the relevant variables are characterized by instability, although each one of a different degree.
This will be better clarified as we come to chap. 18, "The General Theory restated". Here Keynes summarises his theory as presented in the previous chapters: i) the physical conditions of the capital goods industries, ii) the state of confidence regarding the expected returns; iii) the propensity determining the liquidity preference and the quantity of money determine the rate of new investment (GT, p. 248) .
A change in the rate of investment, through a change in the level of income, will carry with it a change in the aggregate consumption in the same direction but not in the same amount of the latter. The proportion of the increase (decrease) on aggregate income is given by the operating of the investment multiplier. But this will reflect also on the schedule of liquidity preference, because "an increment (or decrement) of employment is liable, however, to raise (or lower) the schedule of liquidity preference…" p. 248.
Thus the demand for money tends to change, even at stable wages unit and prices, "…but in addition the wage unit itself will tend to rise as employment improves, and the increase in output will be accompanied by a rise of prices (in terms of the wage-unit) owing to increasing cost in the short period.
"Thus the position of equilibrium will be influenced by these repercussions; and there are other repercussions also. Moreover, there is not one of the above factors which is not liable to change without much warning, and sometimes substantially. Hence the extreme complexity of the actual course of events" (p. 249).
This shows how difficult is to exactly describe and grasp in a theoretical model the variable involved in economic life. However Keynes is not suggesting to give up any attempt to understand the economic phenomena. In fact he add: "Nevertheless, these seem to be the factors which is useful and convenient to isolate…and our practical intuition (which can take account of a more detailed complex of facts than can be treated in general principles) will be offered a less intractable material upon which to work. (p.249).
This way Keynes concludes the paragraph. The remaining of the chapter is devoted to discuss the hypothetical characteristics of the propensities that could lead to a stable system. It finishes with a strong statement about the necessity to attempt at governing the tendencies as they are not "a necessary principle which cannot be changed" (GT, p. 254).
12. So far we have a theory that explain the level of output and employment as being determined by exogenous parameters; full employment equilibrium cannot thus be restored by simply removing rigidities of any kind.
The last chapter of the book (chap. 24) a chapter quite ignored by the profession to our knowledge, is titled Concluding Notes on the Social Philosophy towards which the General Theory Might Lead. Keynes starts with a strong statement of ethical nature: "The outstanding faults of economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and income". (GT, p. 372, italics added).
He notes how the theory presented in the previous chapters is relevant for the first of the mentioned faults, unemployment. But there are two aspects of the theory that are also relevant for the second one. There first one relates to the orthodox belief according to which the accumulation of capital, and thus the growth of output, is favoured by a high proportion of saving out of income, i.e. on "the savings of the rich out of their superfluity". But we saw that, on the contrary, the arguments presented in the GT are conducive to the conclusion that, unless we are in a full employment equilibrium, the investment is not encouraged by a low propensity to consume but it is impeded by it. A strong dynamic of demand is probably, all other things being given, to strengthen the inducement to invest. So, as Keynes adds:
"measures for the redistribution of incomes in a way likely to raise the propensity to consume may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital.
[…] Thus our argument leads towards the conclusion that in the contemporary world the growth of wealth, so far from being dependent on the abstinence of the rich, as is commonly supposed, is more likely to be impeded by it. One of the chief social justifications of great inequality of wealth s, therefore, removed". (p. 373)
The second aspect, much more fundamental as far as the distribution of income is concerned, descends from the theory of interest presented in the GT. In the orthodox theory a relative high rate of interest is justified by the necessity to provide a sufficient stimulus to save. But, as we have just seen, savings are bound to be determined by investments and not the other way around. As the inducement to invest is also influenced by a low rate of interest, as far as we are not in a full employment position, increases in saving (lower consumption expenditure) are not necessary to achieve a higher level of investment. So the very conclusion of the old theory is completely reversed and there is not any "objective" motive to an high rate of interest and the related return on capital.
A further strong attack at the ethical basis of neoclassical theory of distribution follows with the following propositions:
"… the return from them [capital instruments] would have to cover little more than their exhaustion by wastage and obsolescence together with some margin to cover risk and the exercise of skill and judgment. In short the aggregate return from durable goods in the course of their life …just cover their labour-cost of production plus an allowance for risk and the costs of skills and supervision" p. 375.
This can be viewed as a "revolution", in so far as it puts under severe discussion the essence of the marginal theory of income distribution, according to which the reward of the "factors of production" are objectively determined in their own markets, by the law of marginal productivity.
We would like to conclude with two quotations; one more from the GT and the other one from the already mentioned article by Shackle (1973) . The first stresses the ethical imprinting of Keynes' book: "…this state of affairs would be quite compatible with some measure of individualism, yet it would mean the euthanasia of the rentier, and, consequently, the euthanasia of the cumulative oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capital." (pp. 375-376).
Finally, the following quotation of Shackle(1973) reflects the very essence of the GT:
"…in human affairs the future is different from the past, different in nature and essence (for one is figment and the other is, in some sense, "fact"), and different in form, for what we imagine as happening may be quite betrayed by history, when the present has moved from the beginning to the end of the interval" (p. 517).
